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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3125
___________
ISRAEL PENA ESPARZA, a/ka Rene Pena, a/ka/Izzy Pena, aka Conrad Pena,
aka Javier E. Pena, a/k/a Raul Esparza, a/k/a Ruben Garcia, a/k/a Renee Garcia,
a/k/a Jose G. Pena,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A008-640-500)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 14, 2011
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed :April 1, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Israel Pena Esparza petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). We will affirm.
I.
Esparza, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States as a
lawful permanent resident in 1954. In October 1996, he was convicted in Texas state
court of unlawful possession of marijuana and, in 2002, he was convicted of domestic
assault. In January 2006, Esparza was convicted in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. As a result of
those convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal
proceedings against Esparza by filing a Notice to Appear, charging him with
removability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)] (alien convicted of controlled substance offense);
INA § 237(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)] (alien convicted of possession of a
firearm); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] (alien convicted of an
aggravated felony); and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)] [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] (alien
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude). Esparza conceded
removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.
At an administrative hearing, the IJ informed Esparza that because his firearms
conviction constituted a “particularly serious crime,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), he
could be considered only for deferral of removal under the CAT. Esparza then testified
in support of his CAT application, claiming that, upon his return to Mexico, he will be
tortured by drug traffickers due to his deceased son’s unpaid debt. Specifically, he
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testified that after his son was killed in 1995 in the El Paso, Texas area, he received a
visit from several unknown individuals who informed him that he had become
responsible for the payment of his son’s drug debt.
Esparza testified that he and his family relocated to another part of Texas shortly
after the incident. Although he has not heard from those individuals since that time, he
remains fearful that he will be harmed. He testified that he believes that if he is removed
to Mexico, individuals from El Paso will communicate with members of the same drug
cartel who live in Mexico, and that they will be instructed to harm him. Esparza also
believes that the corrupt police force in the area of Mexico to which he will return,
Juarez, will be unwilling to protect him.
The IJ denied Esparza’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT,
finding that he was unable to satisfy his burden of proof. Specifically, he concluded that
Esparza had not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon
his return to Mexico based on his experience fifteen years earlier in the United States.
The IJ noted that Esparza could not identify during the hearing who had threatened him
following his son’s death, but that, in any event, neither he nor his family had been
contacted in the years since. The IJ therefore concluded that Esparza’s claim that he
would be tortured by unknown persons, at the government’s acquiescence, was
speculative.
Esparza timely appealed the decision to the BIA and, on June 29, 2010, the BIA
dismissed the appeal, concluding that the IJ correctly determined that Esparza was unable
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to meet his burden of proof under the CAT. Esparza filed a timely petition for review.
II.
Because Esparza has been convicted of an aggravated felony, a determination he
does not challenge, our review of the denial of relief under the CAT is limited to
constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D); Pierre v.
Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Where, as here, the BIA agrees
with the decision and analysis of the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both
decisions. See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).
To qualify for deferral of removal under the CAT, an applicant must satisfy the
same requirements for withholding of removal under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.17(a). That is, he must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be
tortured if removed to the country in question. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). He must
also show that the torture will be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1), (7); Silva- Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir.
2007).
III.
Esparza first argues that the IJ and BIA overlooked the fact that he identified in his
asylum application the Juarez drug cartel as the group that seeks to harm him. He claims
that as a result of that error, they improperly concluded that he was unable to identify
who he believes will harm him upon his return to Mexico. We find Esparza’s argument
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unpersuasive.
Although it is true that Esparza indicated in his asylum statement that his son was
friends with members of the Juarez drug cartel, during the administrative hearing he
admitted that he did not know who approached him following his son’s funeral – “[it]
was some people I don’t even know, some, some young. They were about my son’s age,
27, 28. I didn’t even know the people . . .” See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 123.
Esparza did not mention the Juarez cartel during his hearing, explaining only that he did
not know who had approached him and that he had not had any contact with those
persons in the years since. We perceive no error in the agency’s decision to give
credence to Esparza’s testimony.
Esparza also argues that the IJ applied the wrong standard of review in assessing
his claim for deferral of removal under the CAT. Specifically, he claims that the IJ
incorrectly applied the “more likely than not,” standard instead of the proper “willful
blindness” standard. See Pet. Br. at 4. Esparza appears to overlook the fact that these
standards apply to different elements of the CAT claim. As indicated above, 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2) sets forth the overall controlling standard: the burden is on the applicant
“to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to
the proposed country of removal.” The term “torture” is defined by 8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a)(1) which requires, among other things, severe pain or suffering which “is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.” “Willful blindness” is a means of
5

satisfying the acquiescence test, see Silva-Rengifo., 473 F.3d at 69, but is not a substitute
for the “more likely than not standard.”
Esparza has not demonstrated that the IJ applied the wrong standard of review.
Indeed, the IJ carefully set forth the proper standard in his decision, see A.R. 57-59, and
there is no evidence to suggest that he misapplied the standard for showing government
acquiescence. 1
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

1

Esparza also argues that the IJ improperly failed to shift the burden of proof to
the Government once he “established past persecution when his son was killed.”
See Pet. Br. at 4. However, the IJ made no such finding regarding past
persecution. We further reject his argument that the IJ violated his due process
rights by failing to make a credibility determination as required under 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13. Id. That regulation pertains to asylum eligibility. As noted, the IJ
determined that Esparza was ineligible for asylum, and he does not dispute that
determination.
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